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RETHINKING EXTERNAL FINANCING
IN PANAMA: POTENTIAL CATALYST
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
POVERTY REDUCTION
Jonathan Kamenear
Introduction
Throughout the past century, Panama,
Latin America, and the world have confronted
the forces of globalization and the increasing
financial interaction among nations. While 
some authorities view such interaction as a 
positive force and one that is necessary to 
develop underdeveloped countries, the adverse 
consequences of these relationships deserve 
consideration. Over the past two decades, Latin
America, a region of 150 million people living on
an average of less than $2/day, has paid out over
$1 trillion in debt service to creditors across the
globe. Even with this extraordinary sum of 
capital flight, the region still owes more than
$750 billion. Panama has the highest debt 
service/GDP ratio among Latin American 
countries (20 percent), the second highest 
per capita debt in the region ($2,572), and a 
comparatively high debt service/export ratio 
(17 percent). (Potter, p. 6) Further, its external
debt/GDP ratio stands at 65 percent. (CIA World
Factbook) Looking ahead, critics believe the
booming Panamanian real estate market and the
recent decision to expand the Panama Canal will
raise these numbers to even higher levels.
The magnitude of these figures necessitates
a critical study of one of the most significant
components of globalization throughout the 
past century: external financing. During this
time, Panama and its Latin American counter-
parts have increased external financing levels,
from commercial and development banks as well
as through foreign direct investment from 
private and public investors. The central debate
over escalating external financing is whether this
process acts as a catalyst for economic growth
and poverty reduction or whether it simply 
benefits the upper echelons of society. 
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This article assesses the past and present
nature of external financing and its positive and
negative effects on Panama, comparing the
country’s situation to those of Latin American
and global counterparts. The article cites exam-
ples of current financial initiatives that resem-
ble components of past failed projects which
proved disastrous for Panama’s people and
economy. In addition, it evaluates various cur-
rent and potential external financing projects,
while proposing initiatives to attack the prob-
lems of poverty and economic growth. Most
importantly, the article advocates a shift away
from external financing aimed at export indus-
tries and infrastructure benefiting the elite, and
towards broader social potential projects, rais-
ing human-capital value and reducing poverty
throughout the country.
External Debt from Commercial
Banks and the World Bank
One of the most highly debated compo-
nents of external financing is the process and
effect of external debt received from commer-
cial and development banks. What are the
implications of the Latin American and
Panamanian debt figures mentioned above? Is
there a distinct causal relationship between
debt and important social indicators, such as
poverty, the distribution of income, and unem-
ployment? The World Bank estimated the
Panamanian poverty rate at 39 percent in 1970
and 37 percent in 1980. (Panama Poverty
Assessment) Gian Singh Sahota, who has con-
ducted poverty studies throughout Panama
over the past 30 years, measured the poverty
rate at 39 percent in 1990 (Sahota); and a recent
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) report
has Panama’s poverty level at 38 percent as of
2004. (“Panama’s Country Strategy”) Similarly,
the Gini coefficient1 for the income distribu-
tion of the country has also stayed relatively sta-
tic, between .50 and .55 over the past two
decades, indicating one of the most unequal dis-
tributions of income in the world. (Sahota, p.
82) Further, at the beginning of 1980
Panamanian unemployment was at 12 percent,
and has remained between 12 and 14 percent
at the turn of the twenty-first century.
In short, 20 years of increasing external
debt service coexist alongside unmoving indi-
cators of poverty, distribution of income, and
unemployment. Panama and other Latin
American countries have paid out more than $1
trillion in debt service over the past 20 years
and are en route to pay more in the future; yet,
the vital economic indicators have stayed the
same. The time has come for a shift in policy to
reduce these debt service figures and to improve
income and unemployment indicators. First,
however, it is necessary to understand how past
events have brought Latin American countries
to their current situation.
History of the Debt Crisis of the
1980s
One of Latin America’s largest involve-
ments with external financing occurred during
the 1970s and 1980s, ending with the infamous
external “Debt Crisis of the 1980s.” There have
been many debt crises in Latin America over the
past 200 years, such as in the 1820s when loans
from English bankers went into default and in
the 1930s due to the Depression; but the debt
crisis most relevant to this article took place
during the 1980s, resulting from the events of
the previous decade.
In the 1970s, spurred by a surplus of $375
billion among OPEC nations, a huge influx of
capital entered northern hemisphere banks. In
order to pay these funds back with interest, the
banks engaged in heavy lending. Due to the
large supply of “petro-dollars,” loans were ini-
tially structured at low variable interest rates.
Latin American dictators, such as Panama’s
General Torrijos, took advantage of these ini-
tially low interest loans, expanding public
investments during the four years of his admin-
istration and tripling Panama’s foreign debt.
(Rudolf, p. 251) A majority of these investments
occurred in the export and international bank-
ing sectors.
As “petro-dollars” moved real interest
rates towards near-zero rates, the OPEC oil
shocks of 1973 caused inflation, setting in
1The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income
and wealth inequality. The coefficient is a ratio with values
between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect income
equality (e.g. 10 percent of the population has 10 percent of
the income, etc.) and where 1 represents perfect income
inequality (e.g. 1 person controls 100 percent of the income). 
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motion subsequent interest rate increases.
These shocks in turn led Americans and other
lenders to decrease their demand for imports,
causing prices for Panamanian commodities to
spiral downwards. Between 1980 and 1982, the
prices of coffee and sugar, both vital sources of
revenue to fund Panamanian debt service repay-
ment, fell 50 percent and 90 percent respec-
tively on the New York Board of Trade. (New
York Board of Trade) As one member of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC) wrote, “This evolution
of international trade had an extremely harsh
effect on Latin America, as it brought about a
sharp drop in the international prices of most
commodities and Latin America’s terms of trade
fell steadily and sharply during each of the last
three years.” (Economic Commission..., p. 1) In
addition, the United States attempted to slow
inflation by decreasing the money supply, 
setting off a series of increases in short term
interest rates. This move further curtailed inter-
national demand for commodities and accord-
ingly hindered the ability of Panama and other
Latin American countries to pay back their
loans.
To summarize, commercial and develop-
ment banks issued loans at low interest rates to
the governments of Latin American countries.
When these loans had to be paid back, the inter-
est rates had risen dramatically while the prices
of commodities (the life-blood of Panamanian
revenue) dropped, making the loans non-
payable. In addition, there was a significant
reversal in capital flow. Many banks went into
a “freeze phrase” and abruptly halted loans to
Latin America. The loans from the few banks
that did continue to loan money to Latin
America did not help economic growth within
the region because by 1983 most of the new
Latin American loans were used to pay interest
on old debts. (Potter, p. 21) Even in 1990, the
$1 billion sent in aid to Panama went mostly
toward paying off international lending insti-
tution debt, with the rest going toward paying
off the trade deficit. (Council on Hemispheric
News, p. 3) In addition, two-thirds of all export
earnings were used for debt service. (Potter,
p. 12) In all, from 1977–1983 Latin American
debt rose by 195 percent and interest payments
rose by 415 percent, escalating the Latin
American debt crisis. Panama’s debt increased
by a comparable 185 percent during that same
time period. (Economic Commission..., p. 10)
By the early 1980s, a merry-go-round of
debt rescheduling occurred, calling for coali-
tions of banks to increase official lending, but
also imposing structural conditions. Only those
activities that were income-producing could be
financed with the new external funds. On
Panama’s front, Zimbalist and Weeks write that
the country negotiated new loans with com-
mercial and development banks mandating the
country to reduce public spending on social
services and shift that spending towards non-
traditional exports in the agricultural sector.
(Zimbalist and Weeks, p. 129) Resulting from
these conditions, by 1987 thirty percent of
World Bank loans went to export production
while only 2.8 percent went to health, educa-
tion and nutrition. (Potter, p. 21)
Effects of the Debt Crisis of the
1980s on Panama 
The main effect of the structural condi-
tions was the imposition of an export-led
growth model that, according to politicians and
the commercial banks that influenced them,
would be the fastest way to spark economic
growth and repay the banks. Sahota notes that
export crops have received priority over subsis-
tence agriculture which cannot earn badly
needed foreign exchange. Specifically, empha-
sis has been placed on exports of bananas, 
coffee, and sugar, crops that generally use more
productive land, leaving less fertile land for sub-
sistence crops. (Sahota, p. 40) Indeed, in a 
system where a majority of the rural population
barely maintains itself at the poverty line, allo-
cating crops away from subsistence farming
only worsens the situation. Between 1970 and
the time the debt crisis began, the total domes-
tic output of rice, maize, and beans declined by
roughly 3 percent, 25 percent, and 35 percent
respectively. (Sahota, p. 27) According to Gloria
Rudolf, who spent 25 years researching pover-
ty within a small Panamanian rural village
called Loma Bonita, these commodities are con-
sidered staples in a rural diet. The decrease in
the output of agricultural staple crops coupled
with a growing population has inevitably con-
tributed to growing starvation communities
like Loma Bonita, where community members
have faced food shortages more often since the
turn of the twentieth century.2
In addition, negative ecological effects
resulted from an emphasis on export produc-
tion and slash-and-burn agricultural tactics. In
Loma Bonita, the minimum fallow time should
be fifteen years. Conservatively, people had left
lands rest up to twenty-five years early in the
twentieth century; but by 1972 that figure
slipped to three years in the economically
worst-off families. (Rudolf, p. 99) Also criticiz-
ing the emphasis on mass quantity agricultur-
al production of staples, Rudolf noted that in
the past, 1,000 coffee trees had yielded 400 lbs.
of coffee, whereas during the 1980s the same
number of trees yielded only 50 lbs. in a good
year and 20 lbs. in a bad year. This decrease in
yield resulted from an overuse of the land,
which leads to long-term fertility damage to the
lands. Combining this situation with an
increased demand for export crops only creates
long-term ecological effects.
Another negative effect of the imposed
structural adjustment conditions was the pub-
lic sector employment cuts, which along with
the agricultural policy led to unemployment
problems. The official unemployment rate went
from 12 percent in the mid-1980s to 20 percent
by 1988. (Zimbalist and Weeks, p. 129) One may
wonder how it is possible to link export crop
promotion and unemployment effects. As
Sahota mentioned in his poverty study, the gov-
ernment implemented investment incentives,
subsidizing agricultural capital, such as
machines and new farming technologies, for
farmers producing crops that the government
believed would draw foreign currency into the
economy, in order to pay back interest and prin-
cipal on the financing received throughout the
1970s and 1980s. As to the effects of these 
capital-providing government programs,
Sahota states that “capital is cheapened by con-
cessional credit [government subsidies]….Not
only do the latifundistas [large landlords] sub-
stitute capital for labor, even the asetiamientos
[small landlords] prefer to rent machinery for
cultivation.” (Sahota, p. 45) This situation
caused a decrease in demand for labor and a
widening unemployment gap.
What other effects does unemployment
cause? On her last visit to Loma Bonita, Gloria
Rudolf heard firsthand from a villager that 
robbers were outside because “newcomers to
Cope or other nearby places can’t find work.”
(Rudolf, p. 202) Also, job loss often contributes
to violence and social unrest, a situation not
limited to Panama. As reported by a social
activist in Haiti, structural adjustment 
programs that reduce income are responsible
for an increase in violence against women due
to higher levels of frustration and stress 
within the family. (McGowan) In Panama, a
recent IDB report regarding a project entitled
“Institutional Transformation of the Health
Sector” stated that violence is currently the
largest public health problem and is the second
leading cause of death. (“Institutional
Transformation…”)
As illustrated by the 1980s examples of
structurally imposed regulations and negative
effects on rural populations, overextending
external financing can have drastic macro- and
micro-level consequences. These structurally
imposed regulations continued throughout the
1990s, leading to the 1995 labor reforms which
gave the employers the legal right to reduce
working hours and fire workers more easily.
The result was an eight percentage point
increase in poverty between 1990 and 1995. 
By 1998, 39 percent of lending, a total of $4 
billion, was structurally-conditioned debt.
(Rudolf, p. 200)
More importantly, as in the 1970s and
1980s, foreign investors continue to see
Panama as a credit-worthy country with a 
multitude of investment potential, supported
by the stability of a dollarized economy. This
view has sparked a recent onset of new forms of
direct investment that, as shown below, 
threatens the economic stability of the country,
especially Panama’s poverty-stricken citizens.
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2It should be noted this export-initiative trend began well
before the debt crisis, as between 1950 and 1970 the land
devoted to basic food crops within the village of Loma Bonita
decreased almost 5 percent, while export crop production
of bananas and sugar increased by 118 percent and 446 per-
cent respectively. (Rudolf, p. 36) However, because the coun-
try was so deeply leveraged on external debt, during the debt
crisis this practice was justified and heightened.
The Current State of External
Financing and Foreign Direct
Investment
Panamanians need to be concerned with
the location of new foreign direct investment
(FDI), in particular FDI associated with the real
estate boom and expansion of the Panama
Canal, and how current tax structures treat
these investments. Most of all, Panamanians
should be concerned with how the FDI and its
effects are distributed among the population
and who benefits.
According to studies done by Dirk Willem
te Velde of the Overseas Development Institute,
96 percent of FDI received from the United
States goes towards Panama’s financial and
services sectors. (Willem te Velde, p. 56) As
mentioned by many speakers at Panama’s City
of Knowledge, 70 percent of Panama’s GDP
comes from these sectors. Yet, according to
Domingo Latorraca of PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers, those FDI-rich sectors employ only 15
to 20 percent of the population, a segment con-
sisting of mostly skilled labor. (Latorraca)
Accordingly, while current increases in FDI may
be seen as conducive to GDP growth in Panama
and other Latin American countries, increases
in FDI may not necessarily lead to improving
income equality across the country. The reason
is that the sectoral location of the FDI fails to
benefit 80 to 85 percent of the labor force, most
of which is unskilled. Willem te Velde has also
shown that throughout the 1990s there was no
significant reduction in wage inequality stem-
ming from increases in FDI in Panama,
Argentina, Brazil, and Honduras. Furthermore,
in some countries such as Bolivia, half of the
increases in wage inequality seen throughout
the 1990s can be attributed to increases in FDI.
(Willem te Velde, p. 22) 
In addition to FDI’s inability to reduce
wage and income inequality in the labor mar-
ket, FDI has also failed to trickle down to the
rest of the population because of current tax
structures. As Latorraca also mentioned,
Panama has a territorial tax system, whereby
taxes are applied only on revenue earned in the
country. If a U.S. company located in Panama
sells its products abroad, that revenue is tax-
free, an attractive way to entice companies to
locate, manufacture, and hire workers in
Panama. However, if a given company sells its
product in the United States, Panamanian soci-
ety receives no benefits in the form of tax rev-
enue for public projects that could build up the
surrounding communities. In past years,
Panama attempted to tax companies, such as in
1974 when it (along with Honduras and Costa
Rica) placed a $1/box tax on all banana exports.
Transnational corporations such as United
Brands responded by cutting back on exports.
In addition, United Brands gave a $1.25 million
bribe to General Oswaldo Lopez of Honduras to
lower the tax from $1/box to $.25/box, an illus-
tration of the corruption associated with the
elite and powerful transnational companies.
(Elson, p. 303)
A new type of FDI is associated with the
real estate and construction boom, whose char-
acteristics mirror those of the 1970s. U.S. and
European investors, as well as Panamanian
elites, are investing heavily into building and
developing commercial and residential proper-
ties throughout Panama City. A prime example
is the $220 million Trump Ocean Club
International Hotel and Tower project, a joint
venture between American real estate tycoon
Donald Trump and the K-Group. In addition,
the Spanish Grupo Mall is building the $600
million Los Faros de Panama, which will
become one of the world’s largest residential
towers. In addition to the territoriality tax sys-
tem, Panama has sectoral tax incentives that
apply to investments in the construction of
hotels, whereby the investor is exempt from
import duties and value-added tax on equip-
ment and materials used in the construction
process. The investor is also exempt from real
estate taxes on these structures and can employ
accelerated depreciation accounting practices,
thereby masking positive net income during the
first few years of the project’s life. (“Tax
Incentives…,” p. 165) Accordingly, the $220
million dollar foreign investment of Trump in
his hotel and resort may not necessarily gener-
ate spillover benefits to the surrounding com-
munity and Panamanian society as a whole.
The need for external financing will fur-
ther escalate due to the overwhelming vote in
October 2006 in favor of the canal expansion
project. According to Arnold Carlo of the
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finance department of the ACP, the organiza-
tion that administers the operations of the
canal, the expansion of the canal has a project-
ed cost of around $5.25 billion.3 Mr. Carlo has
suggested that at least $2.27 billion dollars of
financing would need to come from external
sources — close to 20 percent of the country’s
GDP — at a time when the country has already
accumulated a 65 percent external debt/GDP
ratio. (Carlo) 
Shifting External Finance towards
Human Capital Improvement
Instead of focusing on external financing
projects that are directed towards the canal and
real estate, Panama should consider directing
financing towards socially beneficial projects,
such as those that benefit education, job train-
ing, and health services. One way for Panama
to measure whether an externally financed 
project provides direct social benefits is by
assessing whether the direct goal of a given 
project aims to raise personal income.
In his study of poverty in Panama, Sahota
described individual income as a function of
personal characteristics, such as human capi-
tal (education, training, health), inherited
wealth, and the labor market. To reduce pover-
ty, human capital must be increased via
improvements in health and education. A
decline in sickness increases the number of days
worked not only by the individual but also by
other family members who are no longer bur-
dened with caretaking. (Sahota, p. 98) As
Sahota has also noted, “The expenditure on
health, literacy, and similar social services thus
is an investment in the poor that probably has
a very high payoff in terms of GDP….From
Panama’s experience it appears that social serv-
ices that reach the poor are indeed growth-pro-
moting as well as income-redistributing and
poverty-reducing.” (Sahota, p. 100) Much of the
external financing that Panama has received
from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) has focused on these types of social serv-
ices with positive results. Accordingly, in the
next section the discussion turns towards exam-
ples of external financing projects that can
result in growth promotion and poverty reduc-
tion. These examples suggest potential projects
for Panama as well as provide evidence from
other countries where their implementation
has had notable success.
External Debt Projects from the 
Inter-American Development Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank
and its representatives are aware of the
Panamanian problems already discussed in this
article: staggering debt issues, a social frame-
work characterized by poverty and inequality,
and a robust service industry whose benefits do
not necessarily trickle down to rural and pover-
ty-stricken inhabitants. In response to such
problems, the IDB has drawn up and imple-
mented socially productive financing initiatives
for Panama. In particular, the IDB has four
lending programs to reduce poverty and spark
economic growth within the country. 
The first program, approved in November
1999 with implementation beginning at the
start of the millennium, is the Poverty
Reduction and Community Development pro-
gram. The IDB has issued a loan to Panama to
fund this program under standard financial
terms with an amortization period of 30 years
at variable interest rates, and a 4.5 year grace
period, in order to give the country ample time
to successfully implement the program and pay
back the loan. The program emphasizes local
investment and basic social infrastructure
developments to increase the value of human
capital. The program intends to create a col-
laborative program between the Emergency
Social Fund (ESF), a government funded finan-
cial instrument created in 1990 to satisfy the
needs of poverty-stricken communities, and
local community organizations, local non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and other 
governmental institutions in Panama. The pro-
gram consists of a local investment component
of $47 million in which a select group of the
poorest regions in Panama have an opportuni-
ty to give input on projects they believe will best
fit their specific local needs. Such projects
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3More liberal estimates based on a higher level of unex-
pected delays and extra costs bring this figure close to $15
billion, as mentioned by Tom Drohan, a Panamanian engi-
neer affiliated with the canal in past years. (Drohan)
include providing basic highway infrastructure
in rural areas to more efficiently transport their
income-producing goods.
Community-driven social projects that
serve specific localities have been implement-
ed successfully in some African communities.
One such program is “Africare,” a coalition that
works with local leaders and invites all villagers
to work together to better their communities
and assist with income- and sustenance-pro-
ducing activities. Stephen Smith, author of
Ending Global Poverty, witnessed these pro-
grams first-hand. One villager in a rural region
of Uganda, assisted by Africare and taken to
Northern Uganda to get a sense of potential 
projects, observed people fishing on a lake. The
villager came back and began to fish farm, cre-
ating a tilapia pond and providing himself with
a sustainable food source. (Smith, pp. 149–51)
Smith reports that Africare acts as part of the
group, providing technical assistance when
needed but allowing the villagers to make inde-
pendent decisions.
The second IDB program, established in
September 2002, is the Institutional
Transformation of the Health Sector program,
also known as Project PAISS (Programa de
Atencion Integral Servicios de Savalanche). The
program is aimed towards developing a broad
package of health services which will directly
affect 450,000 of Panama’s poorest people.
There has always been an unequal distribution
of healthcare resources throughout the coun-
try; and as of 2004, 65 percent of Panama’s
health expenditures have been allocated to hos-
pitals and 28 percent have been allocated to 
primary care, in an environment where the
poorest quintile uses primary care and the rich-
est quintile uses public hospitals. (“Institutional
Transformation of the Health Sector”) The IDB
project expects to spend $23.3 million on the
delivery of services to the poorest jurisdictions
and to those with the least access to healthcare.
Services include prenatal checkups, pap smears,
labor and delivery assistance, HIV education,
and nutritional pills.
The program has shown positive prelimi-
nary results. For example, Jorge Tristan, the
head of Project PAISS, has targeted two of the
population groups with a combined total of
15,300 people. Each of these population groups
is served by one doctor, a nurse, and a health
education advisor. Tristan is in charge of a vari-
ety of services, such as the Program of
Complimentary Feeding for children who are
affected by moderate and severe undernourish-
ment. Tristan reports that he has enabled a
number of traditional midwives to assist with
childbirth. (Tristan) The program brings health-
care to poverty-stricken workers, potentially
leading to increases in their human capital and
income.
Similar primary care health projects
aimed at the poor that have long term objec-
tives of raising the stock of human capital have
been implemented successfully in such coun-
tries as Kenya. There millions of children live
in communities where hookworm and round-
worm parasites are nearly universal. This prob-
lem also exists in Latin American countries
such as Panama where tropical conditions
along with inadequate sanitation provide a
breeding ground for these types of parasites. As
Stephen Smith reports, in the Kenyan district
of Busia 92 percent of schoolchildren were
infected with at least one parasite. After the
International Christian Support Fund began to
implement de-worming programs to poverty-
stricken children, absenteeism from school
decreased by 25 percent. Wiafred Mujema, a
teacher at Nangina Primary School in Busia vil-
lage, reported that “‘pupils who had been mis-
erable now became active and lifeful…. When
they were still infected, they acted dull. Then,
after deworming, they had their hands up and
were active in class.” (Smith, p. 59) By strength-
ening primary care, which receives less than 1/3
of public health expenditures in Panama, the
country can improve the human-capital poten-
tial of its poverty-stricken students by giving
them the opportunity to enjoy a more produc-
tive and fulfilling primary education.
The third program financed by the IDB,
approved in May 2002, is the $10.5 million
Training and Employment Systems Develop-
ment (TESD) program. This program aims to
build a training and placement system to
improve the employment prospects and 
competitiveness of Panamanian workers, 
especially youths and other at-risk groups. Like
the Transformation of the Health Sector 
program, the TESD seeks to raise the value of
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Panamanian human capital by creating a more
skilled labor force. 
In Chile similar technical education pro-
grams aimed at lower income families have had
positive results. One such program, established
in 1992 with support from the IDB, is called
“Chile Joven.” Providing marketable skills to
young people with low levels of income and
education, the program takes its participants
through 200 hours of hard technical skills as
well as 50 hours of soft skills, such as commu-
nication and negotiation practices. According
to “Poverty, Growth, and Skills Development: A
Focus on Latin America,” a study published by
the Working Group for International
Cooperation in Skills Development, the pro-
gram reached its target market and resulted in
the majority of the trainees entering the labor
market or going on to further education. In
addition, 90 percent of the enterprises which
hired these laborers were satisfied with the
training given by the program. (“Poverty,
Growth, and Skills Development…,” p. 16) For
Panama, where the unemployment rate is near
30 percent for the 15 to 24-year-old category,
this program has enormous potential. 
The fourth external debt project that the
IDB has set up for Panama, created in
November 2003, is called the Rural Microcredit
Expansion in the Central Provinces program.
This program aims to boost the incomes and
improve the living conditions of poor, rural
inhabitants in Panama’s central province by
providing greater access to microfinance serv-
ices and products. Currently, small and micro
businesses have a difficult time obtaining fund-
ing from the government. Where available, pri-
vate lending usually comes at usurious interest
rates. Under the IDB program, 8,000 low-
income rural inhabitants will have the oppor-
tunity to gain access to affordable credit to 
create their own businesses.4 Further, microfi-
nance allows small farmers to gain access to
credit to employ innovative agricultural tech-
niques to restore ecologically unstable land. 
As Rudolf wrote in her study of Loma Bonita,
“Community members suffered a lack of capi-
tal, credit, education…that set great constraints
on what they could do or reap.” (Rudolf, p. 214)
The microfinance program, along with the
training and development program, could help
break down those constraints, enhancing rural
productivity and potential. 
Murdoch and Armendáriz de Aghion’s
Economics of Microfinance illustrates the
impacts of microfinance on rural inhabitants.
One of their anecdotal examples consists of a
woman with a family of seven who lives in a
poor area of Mexico. With $150 from ADMIC, a
local micro-lender, the woman bought sewing
supplies and grew a business where she could
sell approximately one hundred baskets, dolls
and mirrors. By the tenth loan, she had enough
capital to install a toilet in her home. (Murdoch
and Armendáriz de Aghion, p. 199) Another
illustration deals with members of the Grameen
Bank, one of Bangladesh’s oldest microfinance
banks, whose membership has grown to over
2.4 million people since 1976. The average bor-
rower from the bank experiences a 126 percent
increase in self-employment profits. (Murdoch
and Armendáriz de Aghion, p. 202) The demon-
strated growth of microfinance institutions
across the world should give Panama assurance
that the practice will be beneficial in raising its
citizens out of poverty by replacing indirect
large-scale debt with smaller scale affordable
debt.
Recommendations
Like its Latin American counterparts,
Panama has over-leveraged itself with large-
scale debt financing, thereby promoting unsus-
tainable development and forcing the country
to act in the best interest of its commercial
bank creditors. These actions have benefited a
narrow elite class within and outside Panama,
all to the detriment of internal economic
growth among the broader general population.
The costs of growth-promoting initiatives
are relatively low in contrast to the gross
amount of debt service currently paid out on an
annual basis. In its Panama Poverty
Assessment of 2000, the World Bank stated that
the cost of eliminating extreme poverty in
Panama would not be high, with an estimated
4The program is consistent with Sahota’s recommenda-
tion of creating capabilities among the poor through a micro
approach rather than simply creating jobs through a macro
approach. (Sahota, p. 194)
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cost of five percent of GDP ($750 million) to
bring all poor Panamanians to the poverty line.
(Panama Poverty Assessment) And yet, accord-
ing to Potter and other researchers, Panama
currently pays twenty percent of its GDP, or $3
billion per year, in the form of debt service on
loans from commercial banks unwilling to
favorably restructure the terms of the loans.
Restructuring loans in terms favorable to
Panama could free up resources to eliminate
poverty, creating healthier and more stable
financial partnerships with the commercial
banks. As illustrated by the four IDB programs,
long-term external financing by developmen-
tal banks geared towards socially productive
projects has the potential to produce poverty-
reducing results, leading to the end goal of sus-
tainable development.
Panama needs to critically assess and
change the external financing it receives to
obtain affordable and economically and social-
ly productive financing from both commercial
and developmental banks as well as from for-
eign direct investment from individuals and
institutions. In addition, Panama needs to
actively anticipate global market trends relat-
ed to interest rates and commodity prices to
avoid another crisis similar to that of the 1980s.
With regard to global financial interac-
tion, Panama needs to implement financial
controls to prevent devastating amounts of cap-
ital flight from leaving the country, as hap-
pened during the Noriega invasion in 1988,
when an estimated $7 billion left in capital
flight to the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas.
(Zimbalist and Weeks, p. 148) If Panama wants
to hedge against the negative effects of these
actions, it might emulate the model of Chile,
which requires foreign investors to keep a por-
tion of capital that is brought into the country
in interest-free accounts with the country’s cen-
tral bank. (Potter, p. 63)
Panama also needs to restructure its cur-
rent debt, much of which was contracted 
during the 1980s, by creating agreements with
creditors to reduce service payments and deploy
the savings towards developmental infrastruc-
ture as has been done in Uganda. Uganda,
ranked as one of the poorest countries in 
the world in 1999, persuaded its creditors to
reduce debt service from $150 million to $120
million, and invested the savings towards
health and education programs. Accordingly,
its Universal Primary Education initiative
increased primary education participation 
from 2.6 million to 5.9 million children. These 
education initiatives aim to create a class of pro-
ductive and skilled people, leading to a long-
term increase in economic growth. (Hanlon) 
Panama must also take action to regulate
and balance its external financing, investment,
and loans not only to raise GDP, but to fund
projects to reduce poverty and promote broad-
er development. External financing that nar-
rowly aims to build up GDP quickly without
building a sound infrastructure, such as the
export-initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, has
not solved the problems of unemployment, vio-
lence, and poverty, all of which have remained
relatively constant over the past quarter cen-
tury. Panama needs to aggressively ensure that
new financing related to real estate and the
canal is controlled and paired with long-term
economic development projects.
By structuring and utilizing external
financing with the aim of long-term economic
growth that benefits all of its inhabitants,
Panama can stabilize its economy, reduce
unemployment, and more evenly distribute
income throughout the country. 
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